According to the Regional Court, it follows from Section 2 of the Income Tax Act that a footballer is subject to tax in the Czech Republic by reason of his residence, permanent home or other similar criteria if he had resided in the Czech Republic (continuously or in several periods) for at least 183 days in 2011 or if he had a permanent home in the Czech Republic in circumstances from which it can be inferred that he intended to reside there permanently. If at least one of these conditions is met, the footballer would be a Czech tax resident within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Income Tax Act and would be liable to tax on the basis of that (i.e. residence, permanent home or similar criteria). He would therefore also be a resident of the Czech Republic within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Double Taxation Treaty.
The Regional Court did not find any reason to apply Article 5 or Article 3(2) of the Double Taxation Treaty, since the contested decision is based, quite correctly, on the interpretation of Article 4 of the Treaty and, in particular, on the fact that the applicant did not bear the burden of proof to establish that the footballer was a tax resident of the Czech Republic.
With regard to the objections challenging the procedure under section 38s of the Income Tax Act, the Court states that that provision does not give the tax authorities any margin of appreciation when it comes to determining the basis for calculating the tax levied or withheld. It clearly states that the basis for calculating the amount of tax levied or withheld, including advances, is the amount which, after collection or withholding, would have remained after the amount actually paid by the taxpayer to the taxpayer. It is therefore irrelevant what amount the footballer invoiced to the claimant, but only what amount was actually paid to him. At the same time, the applicant’s argument that, if the tax had not been paid by a domestic person, only the actual income would have been the taxable amount is not valid. Such a situation cannot arise at all in the case of a procedure under section 38s of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, in the Court’s view, the tax authorities did not err in failing to address the question of actual income as the applicant had envisaged it and in relying only on the amounts paid by the applicant to the footballer.
An appeal was filed with the Supreme Administrative Court.
Judgement of the Court
The Supreme Administrative Court found the first ground of appeal (failure to discharge the burden of proof) to be well-founded and therefore set aside the judgment of the Regional Court under appeal. Since the defects complained of cannot be remedied in the proceedings before the Regional Court, but can only be remedied in the proceedings before the administrative authority, the Supreme Administrative Court also annulled the defendant’s decision, which is bound in further proceedings by the legal opinion expressed above (in particular paragraph  of the judgment).
 As the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the judgment of the Regional Court and at the same time annulled the decision of the administrative authority pursuant to Article 110(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is obliged to decide on the costs of the proceedings preceding the annulled decision of the Regional Court (Article 110(3), second sentence, of the Code of Civil Procedure). In this case, the costs of the proceedings on the action and the costs of the proceedings on the appeal form a single unit and the Supreme Administrative Court decided on their compensation in a single judgment based on Article 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure (cf. judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 19 November 2008, No 1 As 61/2008 98).
 The defendant was unsuccessful in the case and is therefore not entitled to reimbursement of its costs. The complainant was fully successful in the case, therefore the Supreme Administrative Court awarded him compensation for the costs of the proceedings against the defendant pursuant to Article 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure in conjunction with Article 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Those costs consisted of CZK 8 000 for court fees (court fee for the application of CZK 3 000 and court fee for the appeal of CZK 5 000).
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